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Abstract 
 
This bachelor’s thesis is an attempt to find out if match results, investor expectations and 
stock market fluctuation affect stock returns for publicly traded football clubs. The number 
of publicly traded football clubs has decreased a lot in the last 20 years. This study focuses 
on one specific English football club, the Manchester United. The observed events are the 
club’s matches played on weekends in the top English football league. Because the club 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange only in 2012, the sample size remains quite thin 
although large enough for this study to be conducted. 
 
The main tool used in the study is SPSS data analytics software and its multiple regression 
analysis specifically. Variables included in the regression models are stock market index, 
match results and investor expectations, which is measured by the stock price change prior 
to a match weekend. 
 
The results of this study were quite inconclusive. It was a struggle to find statistical 
significance given the challenges posed by the low sample size. The clearest of results was 
that the Manchester United stock price does in fact correlate with the stock exchange index 
chosen for the study. The fact that any significant coefficients were evidenced only in a 
three-day observation period following a match weekend supports the findings of earlier 
studies, in that it takes two to three days for a match result to be incorporated into the stock 
price. The findings also show, that match results do have an impact on the stock price, with 
wins leading to positive returns while draws and losses generally result in negative returns. 
Investor expectations did not appear to impact stock returns after a match event in this 
research. 
 
Keywords football, soccer, stocks, shares, public, stock, exchange, 
investors, multiple, regression 
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1 Introduction 
This bachelor’s thesis researches the impact that football match results, pre-
match stock returns and stock market fluctuations have on the share price of 
publicly traded football clubs. The focus is on the English football giant 
Manchester United FC. 
The professional football industry offers a unique platform for business studies, 
as the companies (clubs) involved often have objectives other than financial 
success. The fundamental contradictions between financial success off the pitch 
and athletic success on the pitch can raise questions about the ultimate goals of 
professional football clubs: are they more concerned with generating profits or 
succeeding in football competitions? Financial performance evidence from the 
English top tier football league, Barclays Premier League, seems to point towards 
the latter, as the 2013/2014 season was only the first one this century in which 
the league’s clubs were able to record pre-tax profits (Deloitte, 2015). When a 
club’s main objective is athletic success, Sandy et al. (2004) regard them as utility 
maximisers as opposed to traditional profit-maximising companies. They argue 
that utility maximisation is a norm in European football industry, whereas North 
American sports industries are motivated by profit maximising. 
Since most European football clubs can be viewed as utility maximisers, it raises 
an interesting question if these clubs can be considered rational investments with 
potential financial returns to be gained. Sandy et al. (2004) note a few cases in 
the US in which club owners have treated their investments as nothing more than 
an expensive hobby. Similar developments have happened in English football as 
well, when Roman Abramovich bought Chelsea FC (BBC News, 2003) and 
Sheikh Mansour acquired Manchester City (BBC Sport, 2008). Whereas 
Abramovich and Mansour have injected their own money into their clubs in order 
to succeed in football competitions, the American Glazer family, who acquired 
Manchester United back in 2005, have taken an approach closer to profit 
maximisation by trying to turn the club into a cash cow for themselves (Conn, 
2015). In 2012, they made a strategic decision to issue an initial public offering 
for the club shares in the New York Stock Exchange (de la Merced, 2012). Since 
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Manchester United is currently the only Premier League club to be listed on any 
major stock exchange and their owners have shown profit maximising 
tendencies, it provides an interesting objective for a case study. 
Although Manchester United is currently the only publicly traded Premier League 
club (excluding Arsenal, listed on the ISDX market), there have been tens of 
English teams traded on stock exchanges. The first club to issue public shares 
was Tottenham Hotspur back in 1983 and the peak years for public football clubs 
were in the late 1990s, when over 20 English clubs were listed. The following 
decade saw most teams getting bought out (or going bankrupt) and consequently 
being delisted from the exchanges (see appendix 1). Rapidly increasing 
broadcasting revenues (BBC News, 2015) and financial control measures 
enforced by the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) (Almunia & 
Platini, 2012) have reduced the competitive advantage of clubs with billionaire 
owners. Thus, English football clubs might become potential investment targets 
soon for profit-maximising investors as well. In this context, researching the stock 
market performance of Manchester United now could prove to be useful. 
Football matches provide an excellent opportunity to test stock market responses 
to company specific events for four reasons. Firstly, matches are usually played 
on the weekends when stock exchanges are closed, thus enabling a constant 
first observation after an event, namely Mondays. Secondly, match results are 
easily quantified by gained points or by a basic win, draw and loss scale. Thirdly, 
football matches are played regularly and often, usually at least once a week, so 
the number of observations is larger than company financial reports for example. 
Finally, there is no threat of insider trading relating to football matches, as the 
outcomes are decided on the pitch. This holds true when assuming that match 
fixing is not an issue. 
When examining stock market reactions to match results, a link between match 
results and investor costs and benefits should be established. Unless match 
results are price sensitive information for investors, there is no reason why share 
prices would react to them. Firstly, succeeding in football competitions should in 
all likelihood increase the merchandise and ticket sales of a club. Secondly, the 
Premier League rewards clubs for their final position in the league standings, the 
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higher a club finishes the more “prize” money they are awarded (Premier League, 
2015). The top six clubs of Premier League are also qualified to participate in 
UEFA’s European competitions, which offer significant financial gains for the 
partaking clubs. The connection between success on the pitch and financial 
performance is therefore clear. 
Football, much like any sport, can provoke immense emotions is people. For 
publicly traded football clubs that poses challenges as their stock returns and 
volatility might be affected by their athletic performance. Baker & Wurgler (2007) 
find that waves of investor sentiment have distinct and important implications on 
individual firms. Professional football matches are sure to evoke waves of 
sentiment but the question is if investors are rational operators or prone to 
sentimental subjectivism, which is why this study includes a method to examine 
pre-match investor sentiment or investor expectations. 
1.1 Research questions and structure of the thesis 
This study aims to find out if Manchester United’s share price is affected by the 
results of their matches, the expectations of investors and the stock market 
fluctuations. Each factor is examined independently as well as a combination. In 
order to define a clear goal for this study, the objective will be to answer the 
following questions: 
(1) Do match results affect Manchester United’s share price? 
(2) Do investor expectations affect the stock returns of Manchester United? 
(3) Do Manchester United’s stock returns reflect the stock market’s movements? 
With the objectives of this study defined, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. The next chapter analyses previous academic literature written on public 
football clubs and their stock returns. Chapter three discusses various research 
methods and defines the methodology used in this study. Chapter four presents 
that used data and the research results with reference to the literature analysed 
in chapter 2. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the study, discusses its limitations and 
offers recommended future research directions that have risen in the course of 
conducting this research.  
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2 Literature review 
This section reviews the existing research conducted on the stock performance 
of sports clubs and how their match outcomes impact their share price. The aim 
is to discover the established connections between the two and the deficiencies 
that previous studies might have had in order to justify the research questions 
evaluated in this paper. 
The late 1990s saw a surge of initial public offerings in British football industry. 
As many as twenty clubs turned public on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or 
its Alternative Investment Market (AIM) between 1994 and 1998. Therefore, it is 
only natural that before the turn of the millennium there had not been studies on 
the relation between football clubs’ athletic performance and their stock returns. 
Sure, clubs such as Tottenham Hotspur (IPO in 1983) and Manchester United 
(IPO in 1991) had floated on stock exchanges for years, but before this surge of 
IPOs, there had not been sufficient data to draw any wider conclusions on the 
subject. 
As with any field of research, the methods utilised have evolved and the results 
have become more accurate and robust along the years. The earliest study on 
stock market performance that focused specifically on football clubs and their 
athletic results was conducted by Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000). They 
examined seventeen (17) different publicly listed British football clubs that played 
either in one of the top two tiers of English football or in the top Scottish football 
competition. Through three seasons (1995-1998) they found that there is in fact 
a relation between athletic performance on the pitch and financial performance 
on the stock exchange. A win resulted in positive abnormal returns of 1% on the 
next trading day, and draws and losses resulted in negative abnormal returns of 
-0.6% and -1.4%, respectively. In addition, they calculated cumulative abnormal 
returns for five trading days following a match and found that the returns seemed 
to increase. For wins, draws and losses, the five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
were 1.3%, -1.7% and -2.5%, respectively. However, the five-day observation 
period contradicts this paper’s assumption that the last two trading days of a 
week, Thursday and Friday, see stock values changing in anticipation of the next 
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match instead of from last weekend’s results. Thus, the results of Renneboog 
and Vanbrabant might have been contaminated. 
The stock price impact of sports clubs’ athletic performance has since been 
studied by many authors and there is extensive evidence that match results have 
an effect on stock price behaviour, regardless of the country that the club is from. 
Brown and Hartzell (2001) find that match outcomes impact the share price of 
American NBA team Boston Celtics. Ferreira (2004) studied two Portuguese 
football clubs, Sporting and Porto, and found that match results had an impact on 
Sporting’s share price with every outcome, whereas only draws had a statistically 
significant effect on Porto’s share price. Stadtmann (2006) found matches to have 
a significant impact on share prices of German football club Borussia Dortmund. 
Scholtens and Peenstra (2007) analysed eight European football clubs and found 
that wins have a positive and losses have a negative impact on their stock prices. 
Palomino et al. (2009) and Bell et al. (2011) follow Renneboog and Vanbrabant 
(2000) by analysing British football clubs and their stock returns after football 
matches and both find similar results. Bernile and Lyandres (2011) expand the 
sample by including 20 European football clubs in their study. They find similar 
evidence to the previous authors. Wu (2011) analyses the Italian football club 
Juventus but only finds significant stock market impacts when they played in the 
UEFA Champions League. National league matches were found to have a 
“negligible” effect. Berument and Ceylan (2012) examine clubs from Turkey, 
Spain, UK and Chile and find that match results affect the clubs’ stock price. 
Sarac and Zeren (2013) find similar results when examining three Turkish clubs. 
Godinho and Cerquiera (2014) study 13 European clubs from six countries 
individually, and find that in 12 of the 13 cases, match outcomes influence their 
stock performance. All in all, the evidence is extensive and thorough: it covers 
multiple countries, competitions and clubs and even other sports and continents 
have shown proof of the linkage between match results and stock performance. 
In all this literature, a study by Zuber (2005) is referred to multiple times as 
showing contradicting evidence but unfortunately this research paper was 
unavailable when this study was prepared. 
6 
 
 
 
Berkowitz and Depken (2014) study the asymmetric reaction of stock markets to 
athletic performance of football clubs. They find that losing a game of football 
predicts losing in the future more than winning predicts winning in the future. This 
leads to the asymmetry in stock returns where losses have a larger negative 
impact than wins have a positive one. There is plenty of existing literature 
supporting this argument: Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000), Ferreira (2004), 
Scholtens and Peenstra (2007), Palomino et al. (2009) Bernile and Lyandres 
(2011) and Berkowitz and Depken (2014) all find that losses have a stronger 
impact on stock returns than wins do. Thus, a loss of a game affects investor 
sentiment on the team’s future performance and therefore negative abnormal 
returns on Thursday and Friday will be attributed to the following event in this 
study. Berkowitz and Depken (2014) also reveal that bad news (i.e. losses) are 
implemented in the share price faster than good news, which is found also by 
Palomino et al. (2009) in their research. They state that it takes two to three days 
for a winning performance to be fully included in the price whereas bad news 
experience very little lag. Nonetheless, they argue that it only takes a maximum 
of three days for stock markets to adjust for the new information from football 
matches, which supports the method used in this research. 
Since football clubs play in different competitions and, based on several existing 
club characteristics, have varying goals regarding their performance in them, it is 
likely that not all the matches have an equal importance to the teams. Previous 
research has introduced various means to measure match importance, one of 
them being the different competitions that clubs participate in. Competitions such 
as the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League (formerly known 
as UEFA Cup), which include clubs from all around Europe, have significant 
financial opportunities for partaking clubs and succeeding in them is highly 
regarded worldwide. Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000) found that these 
European Cup matches had a slightly larger impact on stock returns than national 
league or cup matches. Scholtens and Peenstra (2007) come to the same 
conclusion, especially losing in European competitions results in much higher 
negative abnormal returns than in national league matches. Wu (2011) finds that 
Champions League games have a stronger effect on the stock returns of Italian 
football club Juventus than its national league matches do. Sarac and Zeren 
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(2013) find a significant negative coefficient for three Turkish clubs when they 
play in either of the European cups. However, since Turkish clubs are not among 
the best teams in Europe, the results might only indicate that the clubs had lost 
most of their European cup matches. Stadtmann (2006) found that the coefficient 
for Champions League games compared to national league games for German 
club Borussia Dortmund was higher but not statistically significant. Since this 
study is only concerned with matches played in the national competition, these 
results only showcase the fact that different matches have dissimilar implications 
on share price. 
In addition to varying competitions, match importance has been measured in 
national leagues by relative performance inside the league. Every national 
competition culminates towards the end of the season when clubs battle for 
promotion/championship and against relegation, each with major financial 
incentives for clubs as described earlier. Previous studies on the subject have 
included various tools to measure match importance. Renneboog and 
Vanbrabant (2000) arbitrarily divided the season into two and considered 
matches played in the last three months to be most important. Their sample 
covered only three teams fighting for the important places so results might be 
distorted. Nonetheless, they found extreme implications on stock price for these 
“important” matches. Wins on promotion matches resulted in abnormal returns of 
3.2% on the following day (cumulated to 4% during the week), whereas as losses 
were followed by abnormal returns of -3.1% (cumulated to -2.1%). Relegation 
matches had an even stronger impact with winning resulting into returns of 5.8% 
(cumulated to 10.4%) and losing resulting into returns of -6.5% (cumulated to -
13.8%). Palomino et al. (2009) discover similar effects from end-of-the-season 
match results, although only the matches played by promotion candidates show 
statistical significance in their research. Defining important matches by a set date 
is not the most valid method though, since fundamentally all points are of equal 
value. Thus, earning three points in the first match and earning three points in the 
last match are in absolute terms equal. It is when these methods are taken into a 
context of other teams’ performance when match importance could be measured 
more competently. 
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Subsequent studies have built on Renneboog and Vanbrabant’s foundation by 
creating different models to more efficiently define match importance in national 
competitions. Ferreira (2004) utilised a variable called “relative points to victory” 
(RPV) to account for matches with different magnitudes of importance. This 
variable changes depending on the respective club’s point difference to the 
league leader at the time of the match they play (or to the team in 2nd place if the 
team in question leads). Ferreira’s method is much more dynamic and thus yields 
improved results, which show that stock returns tend to increase when the 
difference in RPV increases (the club reduces the gap to the leader or increases 
its lead at the top) and vice versa. However, not all teams have realistic objectives 
of winning the league. Some might aim to avoid relegation and some might aim 
to qualify for European cups. Therefore, using the same model for every club is 
not realistic. Bell et al. (2011) introduce models for measuring match importance 
through rivalry score and proximity to the end of the season. They find that rivalry 
score, measured by the closeness of the projected league position of the two 
playing teams, is only significant for one of the 19 clubs they examine. Similarly 
to Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000), they discover that the match’s proximity 
to the end of the season does have an impact on the share price, although their 
result is more modest. Perhaps the most advanced measure of match importance 
so far was introduced by Godinho and Cerqueira (2014). In the footsteps of Bell 
et al. (2011), they create a rivalry concept in which they calculate the percentage 
of the possible league points the examined club has acquired and then find the 
team with the closest percentage to it. They argue that this “rival” is projecting to 
be in the same league position as the club under examination, which means the 
result of the “rival’s” game should have an impact in the club’s stock performance 
as well. This addresses the issue of using a same objective for each club. 
Through this measure they find match importance to be a relevant factor. 
Even though literature on this subject is extensive, only a handful of authors have 
incorporated investor sentiment analysis in their research. The work done by 
Berument et al. (2006, 2009, 2012) aims to form a link between football clubs’ 
international success and the entire stock market returns on the clubs’ home 
exchange. In their first study, they observe three of the biggest Turkish football 
clubs and only find one of them to be affecting the returns in Istanbul Stock 
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Exchange via match results against foreign rivals. In their following research, they 
complement the study by showing that the degree of fanaticism for clubs affects 
the stock market implications of their results; more fanatic supporters react more 
strongly which implicates the significant impact that investor sentiment has in the 
markets, although measuring fanaticism is very hard and often based on 
subjective assumptions. In their latest study, they build their case even further by 
finding that countries like Spain and the United Kingdom, whose clubs are 
considered stronger, suffer from (negative) abnormal stock market returns only 
when their clubs lose whereas countries with generally weaker clubs like Chile 
and Turkey, only enjoy positive returns when their clubs happen to win. This 
implies that investors in stronger football countries expect their teams to succeed 
and when they do not, investors are disappointed which leads to negative market 
reactions. On the other hand, countries with weaker clubs are affected by investor 
sentiment that does not expect their teams to win which nullifies the negative 
effect that a loss might have to the stock market. Although Berument et al. (2006, 
2009, 2012) study the implications to a national stock market whereas this 
research focuses on an individual company, this kind of investor sentiment is 
exactly what this research aims to analyse. 
Palomino et al. (2009) find evidence of investor overreaction when a club records 
a win. They hypothesise that market reaction should be weaker the higher the 
pre-event probability (which they measured via betting odds) of the actual 
outcome is. However, their findings show that abnormal returns following a win 
are higher, the higher the probability of winning was pre-event. This points 
towards investors overreacting to winning. Losing on the other hand does not 
suffer from the same effect. They show that the higher the probability of a loss, 
the smaller the negative abnormal return afterwards is. In addition, they observe 
that abnormal returns after a win are stronger in a five-day window than in a two 
or three-day window. Although they do not make the same distinction as this 
study, the findings support the choice made in this study, in that Thursday and 
Friday returns are attributed to the investor expectations on the upcoming match 
as there is a new wave of positive returns on those days. A win in the last match 
strengthens positive investor sentiment which in turn affects expectations on the 
upcoming match. Additionally, in the wake of Baker & Wurgler (2007), who find 
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that companies with low capitalisation are more sensitive to investor sentiment, 
Palomino et al. (2009) also provide evidence that smaller companies (i.e. football 
clubs) experience stronger abnormal results than bigger clubs. Their reasoning 
for it is that larger clubs usually have large institutional owners that are more 
stable and objective than individual investors, who might have stronger emotional 
ties to the club or the sport. By splitting their sample into two (smaller/bigger 
clubs), they find that the smaller half of the clubs experience twice as strong share 
price reactions to match results after both wins and losses, which supports the 
view that investor sentiment is a valid factor when measuring stock returns. 
Another reason for such results might be that for the smaller clubs, athletic 
success is more essential for their financial success whereas bigger clubs might 
have established stable businesses that rely less on individual matches or even 
seasons. 
Bernile and Lyandres (2011) focus their research directly to investor sentiment 
regarding football results and stock returns of multiple European clubs. Their 
objective is “to assess the effect that investors’ biased expectations and irrational 
reactions have on the efficiency of stock prices around value-relevant events”. 
They define two distinct forms of investor sentiment. Much like Palomino et al. 
(2009), they describe a situation where investors apply correct probabilities to 
event outcomes but react irrationally to them after the event due to emotions. 
Secondly, Bernile and Lyandres (2011) argue that investors can be overly 
optimistic (or pessimistic) when approximating the possibilities of upcoming event 
outcomes, resulting in a pre-event value that differs from the discounted post-
event value with rational probability distribution. Contrary to the findings of 
Palomino et al. (2009) who showed evidence of investor sentiment in the form of 
post-event overreaction, Bernile and Lyandres (2011) find evidence that investors 
tend to overestimate (pre-event) the probability of winning by 5 per cent which 
leads to a mean abnormal return of -0.9% after the examined matches. In other 
words, they find that investors have subjective irrational ex ante expectations 
(biases) for their clubs and thus, on average, get disappointed by the results. 
Betting odds have been used extensively in the literature to try and proxy investor 
expectations as well as match result probability. Brown and Hartzell (2001) were 
11 
 
 
 
among the first ones to use betting market point spreads to control market 
expectations with regard to match result outcomes’ impact to the share price of 
sports clubs. In the case of NBA team Boston Celtics, they find the explanatory 
power of betting odds to be marginal. However, basketball matches only have 
two possible outcomes (compared to three in football) and given the fact that NBA 
is played in North America and basketball is a marginal sport in the United 
Kingdom, these results might not have much relevance to the case of Manchester 
United. 
Stadtmann (2006) used bookmaker betting odds to control for match 
expectations in the case of German Bundesliga club Borussia Dortmund. He 
argues that only the unexpected portion of the result should affect share prices. 
By calculating expected probabilities of each match’s outcome via betting odds, 
he is able to define the part of the actual outcome that was not expected and 
compare that to the following stock returns. He finds that the unexpected portion 
of the outcome is significant only in the UEFA Cup, not in national league matches 
or the Champions League. Scholtens and Peenstra (2007) incorporate the same 
method when they study eight European football clubs for four years but fail to 
find evidence that bookmaker odds are integrated in stock prices. Palomino et al. 
(2009) study the predictive accuracy of betting odds and find them to be very 
good predictors of football match outcomes, which is later supported by Bell et 
al. (2011). With the two distinct proven relationships (match results affect stock 
prices and betting odds are good predictors of results), Palomino et al. (2009) 
seek to find out if investors process betting odds as new information and thus 
incorporate it into share prices. However, their research shows no signs that the 
release of betting odds affects stock markets. They propose that it might be a 
result of low information salience compared to that of actual match results. Sarac 
and Zeren (2013) applied bookmaker odds in their regression model to measure 
match importance, however they do not disclose the way it is meant to be 
interpreted thus leaving the rationale of the variable vague. Berkowitz and 
Depken (2014) support Palomino et al. (2009) with their findings that betting odds 
provide very little explanation to stock market reactions. Godinho and Cerqueira 
(2014) follow Stadtmann (2006) by examining the unexpected points earned by 
a club in relation to outcome probabilities derived from betting odds. They find 
12 
 
 
 
that for 11/13 examined clubs the unexpected amount of points they earn (or do 
not earn) affects their share price. 
Betting exchanges provide a different platform for betting compared to 
bookmakers. These exchanges offer a marketplace that operates under the law 
of supply and demand. They do not post their own odds. Instead, bettors can buy 
and sell contracts (bets) from each other and these prices are thus better 
predictors of expectations than bookmaker odds. Most authors have not noticed 
this benefit in their research. Bernile and Lyandres (2011) were the first ones to 
study betting exchanges, football results and stock market reactions 
simultaneously. By analysing contracts traded on the exchanges, they suggest 
that investors are unable to form unbiased opinions about upcoming events thus 
leading them to over- or underestimate the probabilities of winning and losing, as 
stated before. While there is no way to prove that people involved with betting are 
concurrently investing on the stock markets, it does provide a decent measure of 
public expectations. 
Although bookmaker and betting exchange odds have been shown to be good 
predictors of match outcomes, Palomino et al. (2009) have shown that the stock 
markets do not react to them thus making them price insensitive information. 
They refer to the fact that betting odds are not as salient as match outcomes, 
which is why they are overlooked by investors. In addition, bookmakers are not 
motivated by correct match predictions. Instead, their goal is to maximise profits 
so the odds they publish are aimed to exploit the biases of bettors (Levitt, 2004). 
He finds that by exploiting these biases, bookmakers can increase their profits by 
20 to 30 per cent. Consequently, bookmaker odds are not to be seen as an 
accurate proxy for public expectations. Furthermore, betting exchange odds are 
valid proxies for expectations, but fail to predict match outcomes as accurately 
as bookmaker odds. This research does not utilise betting odds to measure or 
predict anything, which in itself is a limitation, but previous research has shown 
that using betting odds has its own deficiencies as well. 
In conclusion, there are multiple existing studies researching the connection 
between sports clubs’ athletic performance and share price reactions. Most 
studies find a statistically significant link between the two. The studies have 
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shown various alternative approaches such as match importance, asymmetric 
stock price reactions and investor expectations based on betting odds. Match 
importance has been evaluated through different views and the studies find that 
international cup matches, matches played later in the season and matches 
played by clubs in the top or bottom of the league table have a stronger impact 
on the respective clubs’ share price. Most authors find that match results have an 
asymmetric impact on share price where wins have a weaker impact than losses. 
Investor expectations have also been shown to have a statistically significant 
impact on the share price performance following a match. However, investor 
sentiment has only been studied by a couple of authors so conducting more 
research on the subject is justified. In addition, none of the previous studies have 
considered that investors’ sentiment measured by share price fluctuation prior to 
a match might have an impact to the stock returns after the match. The following 
chapter discusses research methodology.  
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3 Research methodology 
The previous chapter summarised the relevant researches conducted in the past. 
As one would expect, the methods of statistical analysis at this basic level remain 
virtually same as they were fifteen years ago when the first similar studies were 
written. This chapter describes the prevailing research methodology of present 
day and justifies the methodology used in this research. 
3.1 Different research designs and methods 
Research methods can generally be divided into two different classes: qualitative 
and quantitative researches. The very basic distinction between the two is that 
quantitative research revolves around hard numerical data, whereas qualitative 
research is based on non-numerical data (Saunders et al., 2007). Qualitative 
studies aim to develop theory whereas quantitative studies are conducted to test 
existing theories (University of Wisconsin, 2016). Since this study is of 
quantitative nature similarly to the existing literature analysed in chapter 2, the 
following paragraphs examine common methods in quantitative analysis. 
Correlation tests are a simple way to analyse relationships between two 
variables. As Saunders et al. (2007) describe, a correlation between two concepts 
can be none, positive or negative. When there is no correlation found between 
the two examined variables, no relationship between them can be suggested. A 
positive correlation suggests that when one variable either increases or 
decreases, the other variable shows similar progression. A negative correlation 
indicates that the two variables develop into opposing directions. The result value 
of a correlation calculation is called the correlation coefficient and its value is 
always between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect positive 
correlation). Perfect correlation means that the two examined variables behave 
exactly in a same way; either they move the same exact amount in the same 
direction (positive) or the exact same amount in opposing directions (negative). 
As Saunders et al. (2007) state, a perfect correlation is extremely unusual in 
business research. 
There are two dominant correlation methods used in statistical analysis, 
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient (Saunders et al., 2007). Spearman’s correlation is used 
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when at least one of the variables is a ranked variable, also called ordinal 
variable, which is when the individual observations can be put into an order from 
smallest to largest. 
Whereas correlation measures the relationship between only two concepts, a 
regression analysis can examine multiple variables. A regression test measures 
the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent 
variables (Saunders et al., 2007). The independent variables are assumed to 
affect the progression of the dependant variable which is measured by a 
regression coefficient. This coefficient can take a value between 0 and +1 which 
represents the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that can be 
statistically explained by the chosen independent variables (Saunders et al., 
2007). In essence, the regression coefficient (also called r2 value) displays the 
explanatory power of the regression model in relation to the chosen dependent 
variable. In multiple regression models, where there are more than one 
independent variables, an adjusted r2 value, which takes into account the number 
of independent variables in the model, can also be observed. Regression results 
also display the correlation coefficients of the independent variables against the 
dependent variable, in the context of the regression model. 
Regression tests also include the ANOVA (analysis of variance), which includes 
a method called the F test. The F test result displays the statistical significance 
of the entire regression model (Saunders et al., 2007). In addition to the ANOVA, 
regressions tests can include tests of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity tests can 
prove that the results are not inflated by any correlation between the independent 
variables. Multicollinearity is measured by the VIF (variance inflation factor) value. 
3.2 Research methodology chosen for this research 
Since this research analyses specific variables that are measured by absolute 
numerical values, a quantitative research is the natural approach. Share price 
fluctuation is measured daily in a measurable value that is specific to the 
company in question. Football match results are also easily quantified by the 
points earned by a football club, although a dummy variable is created for the 
purposes of this study. Stock market indices are somewhat similar to stock prices 
in that they are measured by a simple numerical value and are observed daily. 
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These quantitative datasets supposedly have a relationship and this research 
aims to find evidence to support that assumption. 
This research is conducted in three forms of statistical analysis. Each test is run 
with the popular statistical analysis software IBM SPSS, version 23. Firstly, a 
simple correlation of the chosen variables (stock market index, match result, 
investor expectations) to the Manchester United share price is conducted. These 
results give a simple implication of the relationship (or lack thereof), between the 
variables and the club’s share price. Secondly, all the variables are incorporated 
into a multiple regression model to find out the combined impact they have on the 
stock returns of Manchester United. Finally, a primitive arithmetic average 
analysis is conducted on the effect that wins, draws and losses respectively have 
on Manchester United’s stock market returns. 
The correlation coefficients in this study are estimated with Pearson’s product 
moment correlation coefficient because none of the variables chosen in the study 
are ordinal (rank) variables. 
The final regression model is constructed as follows: 
 
 ΔMANUt = β0 + β1ΔNYSEt + βRESULT + βΔMANU_expt 
 
where ΔMANU indicates the percentage change in Manchester United’s stock 
price after a match, ΔNYSE indicates the percentage change in the NYSE 
Composite Index after a match by Manchester United, RESULT is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when the club wins, and zero when the club 
loses or draws. Earlier studies (Renneboog & Vanbrabant, 2000; Scholtens & 
Peenstra, 2007) have shown that in addition to losses, also draws result in 
negative abnormal returns for football clubs. Thus, constructing the variable this 
way is justified.  ΔMANU_exp indicates the change in Manchester United’s stock 
price before a match. ΔMANU and ΔNYSE are observed in a one day and three 
day periods following a match weekend. ΔMANU_exp is observed in a one day 
and two-day time periods preceding a match weekend. The use of varying 
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observation periods leads to a total of four different combinations of the chosen 
time periods. 
In addition to the regression test, IBM SPSS runs simultaneously the ANOVA 
(analysis of variance), of which the F value is observed to measure the statistical 
significance of the mode. This study also examines the multicollinearity of the 
regression model in order to ensure that the results are not inflated by correlation 
between independent variables. Multicollinearity is measured by a VIF (variance 
inflation factor) value. The lower bound of VIF is 1 and values higher than 2.5 are 
considered to be significantly inflating (Allison, 2012). 
3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study is conducted as a quantitative research examining share 
prices, stock market index and football match results which is in accordance to 
the existing research describes in chapter 2. The data is analysed through three 
different forms of statistical analysis: correlation tests, multiple regression 
analysis and arithmetic average calculations with notice to the limitations in each 
of them. The following chapter displays the data analysis and the results of the 
research. 
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4 Data analysis and research results 
4.1 Data description and analysis 
The data being analysed in this research consists of three separate datasets: 
match result data for Manchester United, stock price data for Manchester United 
and market index data for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
Firstly, the athletic performance data of Manchester United is derived from the 
official website of the Barclays Premier League. The dataset includes the club’s 
results from the last four Premier League seasons with a sample period beginning 
from 20/08/2012 and ending on 20/04/2016. As the 2015-2016 season was still 
underway at the time of this research, the last few matches are left out of the 
sample. The data collected from the Premier League website contains match 
dates and match results (win, draw, loss). 
Because of the nature of this research, some observations had to be cut from the 
final sample. Since Manchester United’s shares are listed on the NYSE in the 
United States, the matches played on weekdays had to be left out as the NYSE 
is not closed during them due to time zone differences. The usual kick-off time 
for matches played on weekdays is around 8pm BST (British Standard Time), 
which equals to 3pm EST (Eastern Standard Time) while NYSE trading hours 
continue until 4pm EST. The fact that the club’s shares could be traded during 
the match might contaminate the results which is why these matches are not 
included. In addition, the matches played on weekends that have another match 
played on a weekday in the same week or the following week are not included. 
Since this study analyses the stock market implications of investor expectations, 
this way it can be ensured that the stock price reactions are attributed to the 
correct matches and there is no overlap between the reactions to one match and 
the expectations to the next match. After these two adjustments to the sample, 
the number of observations is 90. Manchester United won 52 of the matches, 
drew 14 and lost 24 resulting in a winning percentage of 57.80%. 
In addition to the match results, the historical share price information for 
Manchester United is obtained from the NYSE official website. This dataset 
contains information from the club’s initial public offering in 2012 (first share quote 
on 10/08/2012) all the way to the present day. This research uses the closing 
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prices recorded around the adjusted sample of matches. Since each of the 
analysed matches is played on the weekend, the closing share prices on 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday prior to them and on Monday and Wednesday 
after them are analysed. The share price of Manchester United ranges from 
$12.18 (15/09/2012) to $19.04 (05/05/2013) in the examined period. 
To control for systematic risk or market-wide effects, this study includes the NYSE 
Composite Index into the research. The NYSE Composite Index measures the 
performance of all stocks traded on the NYSE and thus gives a valid comparative 
for the Manchester United stocks. The NYSE Composite Index data was obtained 
from the NYSE official website. Index values were analysed in accordance to the 
dates that Manchester United share prices were analysed. The NYSE Composite 
Index value ranges from 7896.878 (15/11/2012) to 11239.66 (21/05/2015) in the 
examined period. 
4.1.1 Normality tests 
Regression tests, like many other statistical tests, lean on an underlying 
assumption that the examined data is normally distributed. In a perfectly normally 
distributed dataset, the frequency peak of the data is in the centre with two 
symmetrical tails on each side (Saunders et al., 2007). The peak and the tails are 
measured by kurtosis and skewness values. These give an indication on the 
nature of the dataset; if it is heavily tailed on one side or if the peak is way higher 
than the normal distribution line. 
Normality can be analysed in two different ways: a numerical or a visual 
examination (Saunders et al., 2007). The numerical normality test has multiple 
models of which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Shapiro-Wilk test are included 
in SPSS. Visual analysis of normality is done through interpreting histograms of 
the data sample. The visual analysis is more subjective than numerical tests as 
the histograms are judged on a case-by-case basis. However, in a small sample 
such as the one used in this study, the numerical tests can prove to be too strict 
on the data while visual tests can be interpreted to show a relatively normal 
distribution. 
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To enhance the normality and address the heteroscedasticity of the examined 
sample, outliers were dropped from the sample. A total of five observations were 
excluded because one of the variables examined on that specific event was 
considerably different from other values of the same variable in the dataset. After 
this adjustment, the final number of observations is 85. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) recommend the minimum sample size for 
correlation and regression to be n > 50 + 8m (m = number of independent 
variables, also known as predictors). Since this study uses three predictors in the 
final regression model, the minimum sample in accordance to Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2012) should be 50 + 8 * 3 = 74 therefore making the sample of 85 valid. 
Wilson and Morgan (2007) suggest a minimum sample size for the same tests to 
be around 50. Thus, even though the sample is not extensive, it is reasonable to 
analyse it. 
The normality of the used data is examined visually through histograms and 
presented in figures 1-10 below, along with the kurtosis and skewness values as 
well. In addition, normality test results are presented, although with the limited 
data sample used in this study, most of them do not vouch for normality of data. 
Logarithmic functions can often be used to transform non-normal data to a normal 
state (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012) but since the stock return variables often have 
a negative value, logarithms cannot be utilised here. However, by judging the 
histograms, skewness values and kurtosis values, the dataset distribution is 
found to be normal enough to enable regression tests to be run. The following 
paragraphs analyse the normality of the four variables used in the regression 
model.  
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Figure 3 
Figure 1     Figure 2 
Figure 4 
Figures 1 and 2 show the data for the stock price movement after a match weekend in one and three-day 
observation periods. The histograms show that the data is reasonably normally distributed. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the data the stock price movement prior a match weekend in one and two-day 
observation periods. The histograms show that the data is reasonably normally distributed, although the small 
sample size leads to a somewhat fragmented distribution. 
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Table 1 – Skewness and kurtosis values of the ManU stock return dataset 
 MANU1d MANU3d MANU_exp1d MANU_exp2d 
Skewness .610 -.197 -.256 1.057 
Kurtosis 1.656 .828 1.306 2.692 
 
 
Table 2 – Numerical normality tests for the ManU stock price movement 
dataset 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MANU1d ,126 85 ,002 ,950 85 ,002 
MANU3d ,058 85 ,200* ,983 85 ,347 
MANU_exp1d ,131 85 ,001 ,953 85 ,003 
MANU_exp2d ,113 85 ,009 ,919 85 ,000 
 
 
Although variable showing the three-day stock returns of Manchester United is 
the only one to pass the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (significance > .05) displayed 
in table 2, a glance at figures 1-4 reveals that the data is reasonably normally 
distributed with some irregularities and a couple of minor outliers that increase 
skewness. This causes the failure of Shapiro-Wilk normality tests. The impact of 
removing the outliers before running the tests is obvious, since skewness and 
kurtosis values have decreased noticeably to acceptable levels and MANU3d 
variable passed the Shapiro-Wilk test, which it did not do previously. These test 
results with the outliers still included are available by request from the author. 
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     Table 3 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Skewness and kurtosis values for the NYSE index dataset 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Numerical normality tests for the NYSE index dataset 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
NYSE1d ,092 85 ,070 ,972 85 ,061 
NYSE3d ,067 85 ,200* ,976 85 ,108 
 
 
Both NYSE Composite Index variables pass the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, 
although narrowly. NYSE1d’s kurtosis value is quite high because two 
observations that are distinctly separate from others. 
Running a normality test on the created dummy variable would be futile given that 
it has only two possible values. The distribution of the dummy variable is 51 
observations with a value of one (wins) and 34 observations with a value of zero 
 NYSE1d NYSE3d 
Skewness -.247 .310 
Kurtosis 1.422 -.421 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
Figures 5 and 6 show that the data for NYSE Composite index fluctuation is also relatively normal in one 
and three-day observation periods. 
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(losses and draws). Since the frequencies are relatively level, the use of the 
dummy is justified. 
In conclusion, the data collected from the Barclays Premier League website and 
the NYSE website for the past four seasons of Manchester United appears to be 
acceptable for further statistical analysis. The sample size is adequate and 
datasets are distributed normally, which is a key matter in regression tests. 
4.2 Research results analysis 
4.2.1 Correlation results 
Stock market index correlation 
The NYSE Composite market index is used to measure if Manchester United’s 
stock price is affected by movements in the entire stock exchange. Firstly, the 
correlation between the index and Manchester United’s stocks was examined 
through simple correlation formula in order to justify the index’s inclusion in the 
final regression model. Instead of limiting the sample to only the proximity of 
matches included in the final sample, the correlation is calculated on the entire 
period from 20/08/2012 to 20/04/2016 resulting in a larger sample of 922 
observations. The results of this correlation calculation are presented in table 5 
and figure 7. 
 
Table 5 – Correlation between ManU stock price and NYSE Composite index 
 NYSE 
MANU Pearson Correlation ,471** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
N 922 
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The results show a moderately strong positive correlation of .471 between the 
variables that is statistically significant at the 1% level, which is in accordance 
with the results of Stadtmann’s (2006) similar study. When examining figure 7, 
the observations can be pictured to be on a straight line with an upward trajectory, 
indicating that when one variable’s value increases, the other one’s does as well. 
This result is fairly consistent with Manchester United stock’s beta value of .37162 
(Yahoo Finance, 2016). Clearly the Manchester United stock fluctuates 
somewhat in a similar manner to the other stocks traded on the NYSE thus 
justifying the inclusion of market index in the final regression model. 
Match result correlation 
Match outcome was measured by a dummy variable similarly to Stadtmann 
(2006) researched partly in his study. The relationship is examined to the one day 
returns and three day returns of Manchester United stock after a match weekend. 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 reveals that the Manchester United share price and the chosen NYSE Composite 
index do have a correlation. 
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Since there are only two possible values that a dummy variable can take and the 
sample size is only 85 observations, the results of this correlation relationship 
should be considered with a measure of caution. The results of this correlation 
calculation are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 – Correlation between Manchester United’s match results and stock 
price fluctuation after a match weekend 
 MANU1d MANU3d 
RESULT Pearson Correlation ,080 ,148 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,467 ,177 
N 85 85 
 
Match result dummy variable has a weak correlation of .080 and .148 to the 
returns of Manchester United’s stock returns in one and three-day observation 
periods, respectively. Neither of these correlations is statistically significant 
though, implying that the match outcomes do not have a relationship with the 
stock returns following a match weekend. 
However, a simple dummy variable is not the most accurate method of measuring 
athletic performance in relation to stock price fluctuation. Previous authors (as 
described in section 2) have attempted to measure, in accordance with the news 
model, only the unexpected portion of the match results to increase the efficiency 
of their research results. Some of them have also created models to measure 
match importance via the relative performance of examined clubs inside the 
respective competition. Perhaps variables like these would display higher 
significance in the case of Manchester United as well. 
The reason for a low and insignificant correlation of match results to share price 
could also be, as noted by Bell et al. (2011), that some investors of football clubs 
could be the club’s fans who have a strong emotional tie to the club and being a 
shareholder in the company is a form of supporting the club for them. These fans 
are less likely than traditional rational investors to sell their shares even if the club 
is not performing well on the pitch. However, given the size of Manchester 
United’s share base and the fact that it is traded on the largest stock exchange in 
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the world (Erbar, 2014), it is fair to assume that fans holding on to their own 
shares should not significantly distort the results. 
Investor expectations 
Investor expectations are measured by the stock price fluctuation preceding a 
match weekend in a one and two-day window. Since the correlation function of 
SPSS is unable to distinct between matches that the club won, drew or lost, a 
reasonable correlation for the pre-event returns and post-event returns is 
impossible to derive from the data because the assumption is that when investors 
expect an outcome that is the opposite of the actual outcome, the correlation is 
negative and when they expect an outcome that actually happens, the correlation 
is positive. Although the number of wins is more than twice the amount of losses, 
there would certainly be contamination in the results. Therefore, a correlation 
calculation without controlling the match outcome is not a valid one to examine 
and investor expectations are only analysed in the final regression model. 
In conclusion, the correlation tests are only able to find a correlation between the 
NYSE Composite Index and Manchester United’s stocks, which is moderately 
positive. The other two variables considered are not suited for correlation tests 
though and their usefulness will be evaluated in the regression tests. 
4.2.2 Multiple regression results 
One day observation period 
The descriptive statistics of Manchester United stock’s returns on the day after a 
match (Monday) are displayed in table 7. The mean abnormal return of 
Manchester United’s stock on the day after a match weekend in the examined 
sample is .1183 and the median abnormal return is .0782 which, with the 
assumption that wins result in positive returns and losses in negative returns, 
correspond with the fact that the club won more than half (60.00%) of the 
examined matches. An interesting observation is that the minimum (-3.92%, 
26/04/2014) value was recorded after a decisive 4-0 win. Since that match was 
played late in the season, it could be that match importance factors regarding 
final league position are the explanation, in accordance with Renneboog & 
Vanbrabant (2000). Reason could also be in corporate governance related 
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factors which Stadtmann (2006) found to have an impact on football clubs’ share 
price. These events could be new signings and player transfers, club investments 
or ownership changes, to name a few. 
 
Table 7 – Descriptive statistics for the ManU stock price movement one day 
after a match weekend 
MANU1d   
N  85 
Mean ,1183 
Median ,0782 
Std. Deviation 1,61178 
Range 9,03 
Minimum -3,92 
Maximum 5,11 
 
 
The regression model formed for this study includes three variables: match result, 
market index and investor expectations. Match result is observed for the specific 
event examined, market index is observed for the same observation period as 
the club’s stock returns and investor expectations are observed in two different 
time periods: one day and two days prior a match. Tables 8, 9 and 10 show the 
results of the regression calculation where investor expectations are observed in 
a two-day window. 
 
Table 8 – Regression model summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,163a ,027 -,010 1,61946 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp2d, RESULT, NYSE1d 
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Table 9 – Analysis of variance 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5,785 3 1,928 ,735 ,534b 
Residual 212,434 81 2,623   
Total 218,218 84    
 
Table 10 – Coefficiency statistics 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,053 ,278  -,191 ,849 
RESULT ,306 ,360 ,093 ,848 ,399 
NYSE1d ,183 ,228 ,088 ,802 ,425 
MANU_exp
2d 
,075 ,079 ,105 ,954 ,343 
 
 
The adjusted R square value of the model presented in table 8 is -.010 implying 
that the model has no explanatory power towards the variance in the dependent 
variable (Manchester United stock’s return). In addition, the ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) displayed in table 9 shows that the significance level of the model is 
only at .534 which is not statistically significant, implying that the model does not 
have enough variables or the correct variables to satisfyingly explain the variance 
of the club’s stock returns and reject the possibility of chance in the regression 
model’s results. 
The coefficients for match result, NYSE index and pre-match stock returns are 
.306, .183 and .075, respectively. All the coefficients are weak and furthermore, 
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none of them are statistically significant. All in all, this version of the model does 
not show evidence of anything other than lack of it. 
Tables 11, 12 and 13 present the regression results when the investor 
expectations are observed in a one day period instead of two. 
 
Table 11 – Regression model summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,190a ,036 ,000 1,61142 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp1d, NYSE1d, RESULT 
 
Table 12 – Analysis of variance 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
7,888 3 2,629 1,013 ,392b 
Residual 210,331 81 2,597   
Total 218,218 84    
a. Dependent Variable: MANU1d 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp1d, NYSE1d, RESULT 
 
 
Table 13 – Coefficiency statistics 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,014 ,278  -,051 ,960 
RESULT ,267 ,358 ,082 ,746 ,458 
NYSE1d ,190 ,226 ,092 ,842 ,402 
MANU_exp1d 
,155 ,118 ,144 1,315 ,192 
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When changing the investor expectation variable to cover only a one day window 
prior a match weekend instead of the two-day window described above, the 
results are quite similar. This version of the regression model has no explanatory 
power either, as can be observed from the adjusted R square value presented in 
table 11. Only noteworthy difference to the earlier results is an increase in the 
correlation and significance of pre-match stock performance’s coefficient, 
although it is not statistically significant either. Thus, it can be concluded that none 
of the chosen variables have a significant impact to the one day stock returns of 
Manchester United in the following day of a match weekend. 
The multicollinearity tests for both version of the model did not present any 
concerns regarding the results. All VIF values were under 1.02, well within 
acceptable levels. 
Three-day observation period 
Palomino et al. (2009) suggest that it takes two to three days for a football match 
outcome to be fully incorporated into a club’s share price and therefore this study 
analyses the returns of Manchester United in a three-day period as well. The 
descriptive statistics of the three-day stock returns are displayed in table 14 
below. The data is somewhat coherent with the one day returns examined earlier, 
with a mean abnormal return of .1461 and a median of .2363. A couple of 
interesting observations emerge as the maximum value (6.16, 11/01/2015) was 
actually recorded after a 0-1 loss to Sunderland and the minimum value (-6.13, 
07/02/2016) was not recorded after a loss but instead after a draw. All in all, the 
minimum and maximum values are lower and higher in this extended observation 
period, indicating that match results are incorporated into the share price with a 
lag of at least three days, which is consistent with the work of earlier authors as 
well. 
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Table 14 – Descriptive statistics for the ManU stock price movement three 
days after a match weekend 
MANU3d   
N  85 
Mean ,1461 
Median ,2363 
Std. Deviation 2,25553 
Range 12,29 
Minimum -6,13 
Maximum 6,16 
 
The regression results for a three-day observation period following a match 
weekend are displayed in tables 15, 16 and 17 below. 
Table 15 – Regression model summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,282a ,080 ,045 2,20366 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp2d, NYSE3d, RESULT 
 
Table 16 – Analysis of variance 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 33,997 3 11,332 2,334 ,080b 
Residual 393,344 81 4,856   
Total 427,342 84    
a. Dependent Variable: MANU3d 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp2d, NYSE3d, RESULT 
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Table 17 – Coefficiency statistics 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,382 ,383  -,998 ,321 
RESULT ,836 ,493 ,183 1,694 ,094 
NYSE3d ,313 ,179 ,188 1,744 ,085 
MANU_exp
2d 
,156 ,107 ,155 1,450 ,151 
a. Dependent Variable: MANU3d 
 
 
The adjusted R square value presented in table 15 is .045, suggesting that the 
model explains 4.5% of the variance in three-day stock returns of Manchester 
United following a match weekend. Contrary to the earlier analysis with a one day 
observation period, this model shows statistical significance at the 10% level in 
the ANOVA presented in table 9, as the significance value is <.10. Thus, the 
model created for this research can be considered statistically significant when 
examining the three-day stock returns of Manchester United. 
The coefficients in table 17 show considerable changes to the previous model. 
Match results have a very strong positive coefficient of .836 that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This result indicates that a one unit increase in the 
dummy variable leads to a .836 unit increase in the dependent variable, in this 
case the three-day stock returns after a match. Essentially, with the coding of the 
dummy, the results mean that a win causes a .836 unit increase in the three-day 
stock returns of Manchester United. The NYSE Composite Index variable is also 
significant at the 10% level with a moderately strong positive coefficient of .313. 
The investor expectation coefficient has a low value of .156 but is not statistically 
significant. 
Tables 18, 19 and 20 display the regression results when the investor expectation 
variable is observed in a one day observation period rather than two days. 
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Table 18 – Regression model summary 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,262a ,069 ,034 2,21649 
a. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp1d, RESULT, NYSE3d 
 
Table 19 – Analysis of variance 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 29,402 3 9,801 1,995 ,121b 
Residual 397,940 81 4,913   
Total 427,342 84    
a. Dependent Variable: MANU3d 
b. Predictors: (Constant), MANU_exp1d, RESULT, NYSE3d 
 
Table 20 – Coefficiency statistics 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -,332 ,386  -,859 ,393 
RESULT ,773 ,495 ,169 1,560 ,123 
NYSE3d ,316 ,180 ,190 1,754 ,083 
MANU_exp1d ,174 ,162 ,115 1,070 ,288 
a. Dependent Variable: MANU3d 
 
When switching the investor expectation variable to cover only a one day period 
prior to a match instead of two days, the explanatory power of this model version, 
displayed by the adjusted R square value in table 18, drops to 3.4% and the 
ANOVA results do not show statistical significance for the model. With this time 
period, only the NYSE index variable is significant (at the 10% level) with a 
coefficient of .316. Match result coefficient lost its significance in this new version 
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and investor expectation coefficient remains relatively same to the previous 
version. 
Multicollinearity test results for the multiple regression tests on the three-day 
stock return of Manchester United were similar to the one day stock return 
versions. The highest VIF value is 1.022 which is far from an alarming level. 
In conclusion, the regression model is found to be statistically significant only 
when examining the three-day stock returns of Manchester United’s shares with 
the investor expectation variable’s observation period being two days instead of 
one. In that version of the model, match result dummy variable had a very strong 
positive coefficient and NYSE index had a moderately strong positive coefficient 
both of which were statistically significant at the 10% level. The regression 
analysis did not find any significant relationship between investor expectations, 
measured by pre-match stock returns, and post-match stock returns. 
4.2.3 Average stock returns after wins, draws and losses 
One of the initial objectives of this study was to examine the effect that different 
match results have for the club’s share price separately from each other. The 
assumption is that wins result in positive returns and losses in negative. However, 
due to the limited sample size this research covers, the regression results of 
models where the match result variable is held constant would be unavailing. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) recommend that in a regression model where one 
of the variables is held constant, the sample should include at least 104 + m (m 
= number of independent variables, also known as predictors) observations. 
Thus, the sample of 85 observations is too limited for this. 
In order to gain a basic understanding of the impact of different of match results, 
this chapter examines simple arithmetic means and medians of the stock returns 
of Manchester United following wins, draws and losses, independently. The 
returns are examined in a one and three day periods following a match weekend. 
Tables 21, 22 and 23 showcase the findings for wins, draws and losses, 
respectively. The left side represents one day returns and right side the three-day 
returns. 
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Table 21 – Manchester United’s stock returns after a win 
 
 
Table 22 – Manchester United’s stock returns after a draw 
 
 
Table 23 – Manchester United’s stock returns after a loss 
 
MANU1dW   
N  51 
Mean ,2228 
Median ,2959 
Std. Deviation 1,76646 
Range 9,03 
Minimum -3,92 
Maximum 5,11 
MANU3dW   
N  51 
Mean ,4167 
Median ,4082 
Std. Deviation 2,26522 
Range 10,61 
Minimum -5,62 
Maximum 4,99 
 
MANU1dD   
N  11 
Mean -,1512 
Median -,1186 
Std. Deviation 1,33297 
Range 4,66 
Minimum -2,89 
Maximum 1,77 
 
MANU3dD   
N  11 
Mean -,9423 
Median -,5631 
Std. Deviation 2,40796 
Range 9,48 
Minimum -6,13 
Maximum 3,35 
 
MANU3dL   
N  23 
Mean ,0667 
Median -,1268 
Std. Deviation 2,08772 
Range 9,35 
Minimum -3,19 
Maximum 6,16 
 
MANU1dL   
N  23 
Mean ,0155 
Median ,0000 
Std. Deviation 1,39531 
Range 6,36 
Minimum -1,77 
Maximum 4,59 
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The club’s stock returns after a win are positive as expected and the returns in a 
longer observation period are stronger than in the shorter one. These values 
would indicate that wins are followed by positive stock market returns and that in 
a three-day observation period, market adjusts more efficiently to the match 
outcome information. Since both medians are positive, it can be said that wins 
result into a positive stock return in more than half of the examined events. 
Draws are followed by negative stock returns on average, which is in line with 
previous research of Renneboog & Vanbrabant (2000) and Scholtens & Peenstra 
(2007). Interestingly, the effects seem to be the strongest after draws compared 
to other match results. However, as the sample size is only eleven matches, no 
conclusions should be drawn from these. 
Losses are assumed to bring negative stock returns afterwards but in the three-
day observation period, the mean stock return for the club is a positive .0667%. 
However, given that the sample size is so small, the median is negative and that 
the data had a few extremely high positive values (after losses) amongst it, this 
result is probably not a very accurate one. In a one day period, the mean is also 
slightly positive and the median is at zero. 
These very simple calculations do not hold much weight in a scientific sense as 
more complex methods have been used in the existing literature as well as in this 
paper already. However, they do give a crude implication on how the share price 
of Manchester United reacted to match outcomes in the sample period, which 
admittedly is very small. 
4.3 Summary of results and their relation to existing literature 
In conclusion, the correlation results showed a significant relationship between 
Manchester United’s share price and stock market index. In the regression tests, 
market index was the only variable to show statistical significance in two of the 
four versions, similarly to Stadtmann’s (2006) observation from Germany. 
Regression tests do not indicate that investor expectations, in the way they are 
measured here, affect the post-match returns of Manchester United. In two of the 
regression models though, the investor expectation variable’s significance was 
quite close to being statistically significant so further research might be 
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warranted. Match results coefficient was found to be significant only in one of the 
four versions which is not as robust as previous studies’ results. Important to 
notice is that in the regression tests, there were no variables that showed 
statistical significance at the 5% or 1% level which has been quite usual in the 
previous studies. Thus, the results are not as binding as they could be. In the 
arithmetic calculations, the results showed much better returns after losses than 
previous research has shown, while draws and wins were in accordance. 
However, these results should not be regarded highly as they are crude numbers 
from a small sample size. Manchester United is the first European football club 
to be listed on an American stock exchange, which might have had an impact on 
the results. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper studied the impact of match results, investor expectations and stock 
market movements on the stock returns of Manchester United following their 
matches in the Barclays Premier League from 2012 to 2016. The research was 
conducted as an empirical quantitative case study and the data was examined 
using basic statistical analysis tools of correlation, multiple regression and 
arithmetic averages. The regression tests found no significant relationships when 
examining Manchester United’s one day stock returns after a match weekend. 
When examining the three-day stock returns however, the results indicate that 
match results and stock market movements do affect the behaviour of the club’s 
share price. Only the investor expectation variable was found statistically 
insignificant in each test, although only by a small margin. To answer the research 
questions defined in chapter one based on these results, match results do affect 
Manchester United’s share price, investor expectations do not affect the stock 
returns of Manchester United and Manchester United’s stock movements do 
reflect the movements in the stock exchange in a moderate manner, as the 
correlation test displays. 
5.1 Limitations of the study 
There are certain limitations regarding the methodology and data collection of this 
study. Firstly, the data sample examined consists of only 85 observations which 
can be considered quite small, although academically valid as explained in the 
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earlier chapters. Secondly, the correlation and arithmetic average analyses are 
very basic and do not hold much academic value on their own. Finally, there are 
some inherent limitations to regression analysis. Namely the assumption of 
linearity (Saunders et al., 2007), although it is widely accepted in statistical 
analysis. Linearity assumption means that the data is expected to fall on a straight 
line although having data like that is very unusual. In addition, the regression 
model is based on an assumption of normal distribution of data. Much like 
linearity, normal data distribution is highly unlikely to appear in statistical research 
though. 
5.2 Recommendations for further research 
Since Manchester United is now listed on the NYSE and was previously listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, a comparative study between these two time 
periods might provide interesting findings. In addition, investor expectations 
variable showed promise in this study, but a more extensive study on it could be 
undertaken to provide more evidence on the subject. Overall, this study wavered 
on the edge of reasonability and a more robust research on the subject would be 
needed. 
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Appendix 1 – Publicly traded Premier League clubs in the 21st 
century 
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English football clubs that have 
been listed on a stock exchange 
and simultaneously played in 
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the 21st century 
 
Tan cells = Premier League 
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